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 Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] expounded a theory of 
description for natural language developed as a response to the theory of 
semantic relations in natural language, proposed by Gottlob Frege in his 
paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. That Russell presents Frege’s theory 
quite inadequately is a well-known and quite extensively investigated fact in 
the history of analytic philosophy. Some authors have stated that it is due to 
the fact that Russell was inclined to misrepresent other philosophers’ views 
by forcing them into his own template [Geach 1959, p. 72; Turnau 1991, 
p. 52]. Discussion of Russell’s objections to Frege’s theory takes the form of 
elaborated critique of Russell [e.g. Searle 1958; Geach 1959; Kitis 1984; 
Turnau 1991], as well as of Frege [e.g. Linsky 1967; Blackburn, Code 1978; 
Kitis 1984; Manser 1985]. Aiming at readers who wish to become generally 
acquainted with the issue of Russell’s misinterpretation of Frege, our overall 
goal is to present a lucid sketch of the flaws or oversights occurring in 
Russell’s On Denoting, in the context of Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung, 
to which Russell meant to refer. We will ground our depiction of Russell’s 
flaws on the two papers themselves. In more detail, we aim at: (1) providing 
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a clear survey of both papers for a reader who wishes to become acquainted 
with crucial ideas exposed in those difficult texts; (2) presenting and com-
menting on Russell’s renowned fallacy in the Gray’s Elegy argument; 
(3) presenting Russell’s second fallacy—a simplified depiction of Frege’s 
treatment of phrases which might denote nothing (the Ferdinand argument); 
and (4) presenting possible Fregean solutions neglected by Russell for Rus-
sell’s three puzzles. We show that Russell underestimated Frege three times 
over: when presenting the Gray’s Elegy argument, the Ferdinand argument, 
and the puzzles with solutions. We do not have the ambition to ask which of 
the two theories is better in general and so we will not provide any argu-
ments taken from the perspective of contemporary philosophy for or against 
Russell’s or Frege’s theory as such. Readers who are primarily interested in 
the issue of the superiority of the one over the other will find relevant 
elaborated analyses in the materials we refer to. 
 We will first recall the most important content of Frege’s paper with respect 
to the questions we investigate here. Then we will examine Russell’s work in 
order to show the extent to which he misinterpreted and failed to appreciate 
Frege’s ideas: first, we will discuss Russell’s two misguided claims, which he 
suggested to be a part of Frege’s theory; second, we will make good Russell’s 
omission by trying to provide—within the pre-formal framework of Über Sinn 
und Bedeutung—potential Fregean solutions to the puzzles stated by Russell. 
 
 
1. FREGE’S IDEAS IN BRIEF 
 
 Gottlob Frege developed his philosophy of language in parallel to his 
mathematical investigations and his works became important in both of these 
fields. His seminal paper in philosophy of language Über Sinn und Bedeut-
ung is recognized to be a classic [Zalta 2013]. In the first part, the author 
presented his theory, and in the second part he tested its application in many 
cases of natural language expressions. 
 Frege claimed that one should connect a sign not only with that to which the 
sign refers—reference—but also the sense of the sign containing the mode of 
presentation of the designated object: “A proper name (word, sign, sign com-
bination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. 
By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference” [p. 27].1 
 
1 We will provide only page numbers while referring to one of the two analyzed papers. 
Whether the reference is to Frege or Russell will be clear from the context. 
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Here is an outline of his argument for that claim: if equality is a relation be-
tween the things designated by the names a and b, then (in the case of iden-
tity) the proposition a = b seems to express the same as a = a, namely that an 
object is identical to itself. This is false, as a = b is sometimes epistemo-
logically significant whereas a = a is not. We can speak of a difference 
between these two propositions only if “the difference between the signs 
corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is 
designated” [p. 24]. 
 Next, the author presented three modes of using linguistic expressions 
corresponding to three levels of reference: words can be used to speak of 
their ordinary reference; to refer to the words themselves (by enclosing them 
in quotation marks); and finally to refer to their sense in reported speech 
[p. 25]. He also stated that it can happen that a proper name or sentence, 
although it has a sense (meaning), may be devoid of reference [p. 28]. 
 The first part ends with a crucial postulate: every declarative sentence in 
which we are concerned with the reference of its words is “to be regarded as 
a proper name, and its reference, if it has one, is either the True or the False” 
[p. 29]. Frege (in accordance with Leibniz) then claimed that the reference 
of the whole sentence (its truth value) must remain unchanged when a part of 
the sentence is replaced by an expression having the same reference 
[p. 30]— the rule commonly known as salva veritate. 
 In the subsequent part of the paper, Frege checked whether the salva 
veritate rule applies to the two types of compound sentences that he dis-
tinguished. First, he analyzed a group of sentences in which the sense of the 
subordinate clause is a dependent thought. He identified three cases. The 
first case is reported speech, in which the reference of the subordinate clause 
shifts from the logical value to the sense that it would express as a separate 
sentence, as for instance in the sentence, “Copernicus believed that the 
planetary orbits are circles” [p. 32]. This case embraces especially propo-
sitions with intensional functors, commands and questions. The second case 
is a sentence in which the reference of the subordinate clause is neither 
a logical value nor a thought, but—similar to the use of proper names—an 
object. Here we can rank adverbial or attributive propositions, as for in-
stance in the sentence, “Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the plane-
tary orbits died in misery” [p. 34]. The third case is a conditional sentence, 
in which the sense of the subordinate clause, if taken separately, is merely 
a clue (a part of the thought), and is fully specified only in the context of the 
whole sentence, as for instance the sentence, “When the Sun is in the tropic 
of Cancer, the longest day in the northern hemisphere occurs” [p. 37]. 
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 The second subpart of Frege’s analysis of applicability of the salva veri-
tate rule concerns sentences in which a sense of the subsidiary clause is 
a complete or independent thought. He showed that, in general, whether 
a clause can be replaced depends on whether the subsidiary thought belongs 
to the sense of the sentence or only accompanies it. If the clause expresses 
more through its connection with another one than it does in isolation, then 
the sense of the compound sentence is enriched by the subsidiary thought 
and the clause is not exchangeable, even though it expresses the independent 
thought separately, as for instance in the sentence, “Napoleon, who re-
cognized the danger to his right flank, himself led his guards against the 
enemy position” [p. 38]. 
 
 
2. RUSSELL’S MISGUIDED CRITICISM OF FREGE 
 
 Now let us move to Russell’s critique. We only wish to explicate the 
flaws in his arguments against Frege, so we will omit the presentation and 
evaluation of his theory of description. We will also leave aside evaluation 
of his arguments in favor of his own theory. 
 Russell tried to make his theory plausible through a critique of the com-
peting theses of Meinong and Frege: “I shall then discuss the theories of 
Frege and Meinong [in fact he gave Meinong less attention], showing why 
neither of them satisfies me; then I shall give the grounds in favour of my 
theory” [p. 480]. Alas Russell cited Frege with no reference to exact parts of 
Frege’s paper, which raises the suspicion that Russell’s argument against 
Frege’s competing theory have false or incomplete premises. We will now 
show why this is in fact the case. 
 One of Russell’s commonly discussed arguments is the so-called the 
Gray’s Elegy argument that presents an objection to Frege’s sense-reference 
distinction. Russell’s argument starts with an observation: “When we wish to 
speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed to its denotation, 
the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas” [p. 485-486]. In 
particular: “ ‘The center of mass of the solar system’ is a denoting complex, 
not a point” [p. 486], or “‘The first line of Gray’s Elegy’ does not state 
a proposition” [p. 486]. Russell then writes that if we were to speak about 
a sense of a certain denoting phrase C (let us name this sense s-1), the sense 
of a phrase that we would use for this could not be the given meaning/sense 
s-1 which we want to speak about, but another sense s-2, which is a mode of 
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presentation of sense s-1 that we speak about. Next, he tried to show, that if 
we were not to put a phrase C expressing sense s-1 into quotation marks, 
then sense s-1 would be a constituent of sense s-2 that is the mode of pre-
sentation of sense s-1, and a phrase expressing s-2 would say something 
about the denotation of sense s-1, instead of about the sense s-1 itself. So we 
have to use quotation marks. But if we do this, then “‘C’ and C are different 
entities, such that ‘C’ denotes C; but this cannot be an explanation, because 
the relation of ‘C’ to C remains wholly mysterious; and where are we to find 
the denoting complex ‘C’ which is to denote C ?” [p. 487]. This mysterious-
ness comes from what follows. Whichever phrase we would use to refer to 
the sense s-1 must itself have its own sense s-2 which determines the sense 
we want to speak about, but it poses a problem if it can only be achieved by 
means of mentioning C with the use of quotation marks, because such a 
treatment ends up in providing only a linguistic connection between “C” and 
C, contrary to Russell’s intuition that “[…] the relation of meaning and 
denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must be a logi-
cal relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes 
the denotation” [p. 486]—the meaning of “C” (s-2), is to be logically 
dependent on the denotation of “C” which is the meaning of C (s-1). How-
ever, according to Russell, in the light of Frege’s conception, it remains 
mysterious to identify meaning s-2 as a function of original sense s-1 since 
“[…] there is no backward road from denotations [C as object] to meaning 
[sense of “C”], because every object can be denoted by an infinite number 
of different denoting phrases” [p. 487]. 
 This argument involves a misunderstanding of how to properly distin-
guish between sense and reference according to Frege—it should be not by 
quotation marks alone, but by quotation marks preceded by an intensional 
operator: “In order to speak of the sense of an expression ‘A’ one may simp-
ly use the phrase “the sense of the expression ‘A’” [p. 25]. Another way 
could be to use indirect speech, as in “Copernicus believed that A”. Neither 
the statement, nor the examples given by Russell satisfy either of these two 
rules. For Frege, quotation marks unaccompanied by intensional operators 
are used for mentioning signs, to speak of the words themselves, and not of 
their senses. Russell’s argument itself is internally inconsistent [for details 
c.f. Butler 1954, 361-363], because it fails to distinguish between use and 
mention of an expression [Church 1943, p.302, Searle 1958, passim] and 
confuses Frege’s understanding of the words meaning and reference [c.f. 
Geach 1959]. To partially justify Russell’s not distinguishing between use 
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and mention of linguistic expressions, it can be said that his logical tools forc-
ed him to refuse recognition of use-mention distinction [Butler 1954, p. 361].  
 There are at least three ways of identifying the proper target of Russell’s 
critique from the vague paragraph (p. 485-487) with the Gray’s Elegy argu-
ment. In the first footnote to his paper Russell states that his previous thesis 
from Principles of Mathematics was “very nearly the same as Frege’s” [p. 
480] theory of description. Some authors claim that his critique comes to be 
more coherent when interpreted as a critique of his own theory, which he 
wrongly merged with Frege’s due to inadequate understanding of the latter 
[c.f. Geach 1959; Turnau 1991]. On the other hand, Blackburn and Code 
[1978] defended Russell’s objection to Frege by showing why it could not be 
interpreted as referring to Principles of Mathematics, and why Russell’s 
argument applies precisely to Frege. Their crucial assumption was that Rus-
sell’s uses of “C” and C signified senses, not linguistic expressions [p. 70]. 
A consequence of such an interpretation of Russell’s words [from p. 485-
486] already cited would be that, although he stated that the natural way to 
speak of the meaning of a phrase is by means of quotation marks, he did not 
intend to applying them to the phrase which expresses the meaning we want 
to speak of. This outcome seems quirky: Is it really one of the natural ways 
of using quotation marks to use them not as linguistic signs forming 
linguistic expressions? What was Russell’s notion of inverted commas as 
applicable to a sheer sense abstracted from its linguistic expression? Or, if C 
was supposed to be a linguistic (or metalinguistic) expression that signifies 
sense, would not one speak of a sense simply by means of C itself? Alas, in 
his argument Russell did not distinguish or explain any different uses of 
quotation marks: linguistic, metalinguistic, or some other use specific for 
him. In consequence, Blackburn and Code’s assumption does not seem to 
make their interpretation of Russell’s argument more coherent or clear. What 
is more, Russell’s argument’s premises, as interpreted by Blackburn and 
Code, do not represent Frege’s ideas [to recall this go back to the first four 
sentences of this paragraph]. So even if Russell’s intuition was somewhat 
accurate, the argument, in a strict sense, does not apply to Frege. This means 
that if Russell’s critique was intended against Frege, it was clearly 
misconceived. The third view regarding the target of Russell’s critique is 
that there is no coherent way to understand Russell—neither as arguing 
against Frege’s nor as arguing against Russell’s own earlier views [c.f. 
Urquhart 2005]. In any case, Russell’s general intention to present his theory 
as superior to Frege’s [see p. 480] should follow with an explicit indication 
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of whose views he was criticizing in the passage under discussion. Russell 
diminished Frege by not providing this information: He might mislead a 
reader into thinking that the discussion of Gray’s Elegy applies to Frege’s 
theory and reveals flaws in Frege’s ideas, whereas if it applies to them at all, 
it misconceives them. Obviously Russell’s negligence might stem from his 
superficial knowledge or incomprehension of Frege’s paper. Yet, the latter 
seems very improbable because Frege stated his claims about the use of 
quotation marks explicitly. Perhaps Russell was fully aware of the paper’s 
content, but intended to take only a part of Frege’s theory to combine it with 
his own earlier claims and derive troublesome consequences from it. That 
would constitute negligence in his treatment of Frege’s account. Regardless 
of which of the above possibilities is the case, either way it can be said that 
Russell underestimated his adversary. 
 Russell’s other mistake, which has not been explicated in the literature, 
was made while discussing the problem of the emptiness on the exemplary 
conditional If Ferdinand is not drowned, Ferdinand is my only son. He 
wrote: “Now ‘my only son’ is a denoting phrase, which, on the face of it, has 
a denotation when, and only when, I have exactly one son. But the above 
statement would nevertheless have remained true if Ferdinand had been in 
fact drowned” [p. 484]. Russell suggested that the perspective of Frege’s 
theory was that this conditional sentence lacks a logical value in the case 
where the denoting phrase my only son has no denotation; and yet, in the 
case where Ferdinand actually drowned, this conditional remains in fact true. 
Therefore, Russell drew the general conclusion that, in order to preserve the 
thesis that we are primarily concerned with denotations of propositions 
containing denoting phrases, Frege “[...] provides by definition some purely 
conventional denotation for the cases in which otherwise there would be 
none. Thus ‘the King of France’, is to denote the null-class; ‘the only son of 
Mr. So-and-so’ (who has a fine family of ten), is to denote the class of all his 
sons; and so on” [p. 484]. 
 Indeed, one of the solutions that Frege presented, was to assure a 
reference for expressions in case they would not have one, by means of 
assigning it conventionally in the form of the null class. However, this 
stipulation, as well as the elimination of proper names that do not denote 
anything, seems to be meant by Frege to be strictly applied to logically 
perfect languages—especially mathematics, to which he referred when he 
provided examples for the null class stipulation [p. 35-36]. We admit that 
Russell’s exemplary conditional is difficult enough not to be fixed to any 
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kind of conditional types analyzed by Frege, and it is difficult to infer how 
Frege would cope with it. However, Russell’s conclusion—that in the light 
of Frege’s theory this is a truth-valueless statement (or that Ferdinand has 
a purely conventional denotation)—remains too strong. As for cases of 
natural language compound sentences, Frege was less attached to this 
solution. The first of Frege’s ways of coping with a possible lack of denota-
tion, which differs from defining denotation, is presupposing that denoting 
phrases have reference. For instance, in the case of “Whoever discovered the 
elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery” one must presuppose that 
there was someone who discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits 
[p. 34-35]. Still, Russell’s example refutes this solution, as when a presup-
position fails, the sentence loses its truth-value, whereas in this case it 
should not. But another case where Frege’s theory did not impose a conven-
tional definition of a denoting phrase’s reference was compound sentences in 
which “both clauses together form a connected whole, which as a rule ex-
presses only a single thought” [p. 37]. Let us quote an example of a condi-
tional clause “If a number is less than 1 and greater than 0, its square is less 
than 1 and greater than 0” [p. 37]. Both clauses here express, as a whole, 
a single thought; the presence of a denoting phrase a number deprives the 
antecedent alone of having an independent sense so that the antecedent 
separately does not stand for an object. Finally, Frege surveyed some cases 
of compound sentences with subordinate clauses, in which the way of estab-
lishing reference was not by choosing arbitrary objects, but by constructing 
references out of phrases’ meanings [p. 31–33].2 As we can see, Russell’s 
suggestion that all there is to say about Frege’s treatment of phrases which 
might denote nothing is that he is defining an arbitrary object as reference, is 
misguided. In fact, Frege explicitly stated in his footnote (nr 15), that in 
some cases sentences can be regarded as having a logical value beside its 
part which would be without reference [p. 36]. 
 
 
 
2 It is worth of mentioning, that Frege already proposed in his earlier writings a sort of less 
arbitrary looking treatment of possibly empty expressions: what Russell’s denoting phrase refers 
to would be, for Frege, a function that maps other objects onto logical values [Dummett 1994, 
p. 52-53], and in earlier papers Frege already perceived concepts to be objects different from 
classes [Dummett 1973, p. 209]. 
GETTING STRAIGHT ON HOW RUSSELL UNDERESTIMATED FREGE 129
3. RUSSELL’S PUZZLES AND FREGE’S SOLUTIONS 
 
 The thought-experiment part of Russell’s paper deals with three linguistic 
puzzles that he formulated as a test of his theory’s soundness. Frege’s theory 
also seemed to embrace a fairly abundant group of types of linguistic expres-
sions, yet Russell presented his own solutions as an argument for preferring 
his theory over Frege’s. At the same time he distorted or left without any 
comment Frege’s potential solutions for these puzzles—even though certain 
intuitive solutions seem to be easy to infer from Frege’s paper. Regardless of 
the value of the Fregean solutions, Russell should have explicated them for 
the sake of comparison to his own, especially if he treated his solutions to 
the puzzles as determinants of his theory’s superiority over Frege’s. And it’s 
not implausible to assume that he thought so: “A logical theory may be 
tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in 
thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, 
since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in 
physical science” [p. 484–485]. Below we examine whether Frege could 
have answers to Russell’s puzzles.  
 The first puzzle goes as follows: “If a is identical with b, whatever is true 
of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in 
any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. 
Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley; 
and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we may substitute Scott 
for the author of ‘Waverley’, and thereby prove that George IV wished to 
know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can 
hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe” [p. 485].  
 Russell’s solution, in brief, is that it is impossible to substitute a proper 
name Scott for the author of Waverley, since through Russell’s analysis the 
phrase the author of Waverley is not a part of the analyzed sentence “Scott 
was the author of Waverley.” Therefore, there’s nothing to be substituted for 
Scott. This is due to the fact that the author of Waverley is not a proper 
name, but a denoting phrase, which can be seen by looking at an analyzed 
form of the given sentence: “It is not always false of x, that x wrote 
Waverley, that it is always true of y, that if y wrote Waverley y is identical 
with x, and that Scott is identical with x” [p. 488]. 
 Frege’s solution of the riddle could look as follows: as the given proposi-
tion is in reported speech, substituting Scott for the author of Waverley is 
against the rules, because these two have different meanings (senses). To 
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change constituents in such a way as to preserve truth-value (the salva veritate 
rule), we would have to preserve meaning, not a material denotation, because 
in reported speech reference shifts from ordinary reference to meanings. 
 We move on to a second puzzle: “By the law of the excluded middle, 
either ‘A is B’ or ‘A is not B’ must be true. Hence either ‘the present King 
of France is bald’ or ‘the present King of France is not bald’ must be true. 
Yet if we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the things that are not 
bald, we should not find the present King of France in either list” [p. 485], 
so how to prevent a violation of a logical law? 
 At the beginning of his paper Russell pointed to a difficulty arising when 
a phrase lacks denotation: “One of the first difficulties that confronts us, 
when we adopt the view that denoting phrases express a meaning and denote 
a denotation, concerns the cases in which the denotation appears to be 
absent” [p. 483]. He suggested that a proposition containing such a phrase 
might be regarded as nonsense: “But this phrase [the King of France], 
though it has a meaning provided ‘the King of England’ has a meaning, has 
certainly no denotation, at least in any obvious sense. Hence one would 
suppose that ‘the King of France is bald’ ought to be nonsense [devoid of 
logical value]” [p. 483–484] and according to Russell that is wrong, because 
the given proposition is false. It comes from Russell’s distinction between 
primary and secondary occurrence. When, after analysis, a denoting phrase 
which has no denotation occurs in the main clause, it has a primary occur-
rence and the proposition which contain it is always false, as in the case of 
“The [present] King of France is bald” that after analysis will have the form: 
“one and only one entity has the property of being King of France and that 
one has the property of being bald” [p. 489–490]. If a denoting phrase with 
no denotation is present in the subordinate clause then it has a secondary 
occurrence and the whole proposition may be true. Now consider the second 
exemplary proposition (the negative one), first as saying that “The King of 
France is not bald.” In this case The King of France will be in primary 
occurrence and the proposition after analysis is to be saying: one and only 
one entity has the property of being King of France and that one has the 
property of being not bald. It is false, because there is no such entity having 
these two properties. Well then, in this case both propositions (the positive 
one and the negative one) turn out to be false, yet by comparing the analyzed 
forms of both propositions one will see that the negation (in the latter) is 
applied not to the whole form of the former, but only to one of its inner 
fragments, which stands for one of the properties. Thus the latter is not 
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a negation of the former, so these two can both be false without violating the 
law of excluded middle. On the contrary, if the denoting phrase in the nega-
tive proposition would be considered as being in secondary occurrence, then 
the negative proposition would mean “It is false that there is entity which is 
now the King of France and is bald”. In this case the negative proposition 
directly negates the positive one and is true (as a negation of false positive 
proposition), so there is no violation of the logical law of excluded middle. 
 Now, returning to Frege, we may assume, following Russell’s suggestion 
from the cited puzzle [p. 485], that Frege’s account gives the wrong truth 
value to these two sentences (both are false) what causes a violation of the 
law of excluded middle. The Fregean solution to this might be to leave aside 
concerns about the truth value of these sentences (likewise in the case of the 
sentence “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep” [p. 28]).We 
could solve the puzzle just by saying that, as the King of France does not 
designate anything, these propositions do not have (either wrong or right) 
truth values, so they do not violate any logical law.  
 Now we will take a look at the third puzzle: “Consider the proposition 
‘A differs from B’. If this is true, there is a difference between A and B, 
which fact may be expressed in the form ‘the difference between A and B 
subsists’. But if it is false that A differs from B, then there is no difference 
between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form ‘the difference 
between A and B does not subsist’. But how can a non-entity be the subject 
of a proposition?”; “Hence, it would appear, it must always be self-contra-
dictory to deny the being of anything” [p. 485]. Russell coped with this 
riddle again with the use of analysis of denoting phrases—the difference 
between A and B that seemed to denote non-entity is a denoting phrase that 
does not denote anything: “If A and B do differ, there is one and only one 
entity x such that ‘x is the difference between A and B’ is a true proposition; 
if A and B do not differ, there is no such entity x” [p. 490]. 
 Frege could give an answer to this too, namely that the puzzling proposi-
tion expresses a particular relation between the names A and B, namely that 
they differ in terms of both meaning and reference. About other expressions 
without denotation maybe he could say in an analogous way—for instance in 
speaking of unicorns, the proposition „Unicorns do not exist” could take on 
the form “The name ‘unicorn’ certainly has no reference”. This is all the 
more true seeing that in his paper Frege took into account expressions that 
designate other expressions, and the possibility of propositions that have a 
logical value despite being comprised of expressions without denotation. 
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 During the past hundred years and more, the topic under discussion has 
advanced greatly, and it is obvious that today one should make use of one of 
many advanced formal apparatuses when asking Russell and Frege a riddle. 
However, in accordance with what we stressed at the beginning of this 
paper, our aim was not to establish whose theory gives the better answer. 
What we wanted to show is that one can easily derive some possible Fregean 
answers to Russell’s riddles after becoming acquainted with “Uber Sinn und 
Bedeutung”. Regardless of their level of correctness, profoundness, preci-
sion or elegance, by not mentioning such possibilities Russell underesti-
mated Frege.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There were significant flaws in Russell’s depiction of Frege’s theory in 
Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Russell imputed to Frege the claim that we speak 
of a sense by means of quotation marks, or at least he did not give enough 
credit to Frege’s account when criticizing the sense-reference distinction. 
Moreover, he wrongly suggested that all Frege does to cope with phrases 
which might denote nothing is define an arbitrary object as their reference. 
Russell also passed over the fact that Frege’s theory provides some intuitive 
answers for puzzles presented by Russell in his essay. 
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O TYM, W JAKI SPOSÓB RUSSELL NIE DOCENIe FREGEGO  
S t r e s z c z e n i e  
Reakcjy na przehomowy dla dziejów filozofii analitycznej artykuh Gottloba Fregego pt. Sens 
i nominat [1892], byh niemniej wa{ny esej Bertranda Russella pt. Denotowanie [1905]. Russell 
przedstawih w nim swojy teori| deskrypcji i dokonah jej porówna} z koncepcjy Fregego. 
Celem naszego artykuhu jest zwi|zhe i przejrzyste zaprezentowanie i skomentowanie bh|dów 
i zaniedba}, jakich dopu~cih si| Russell w swojej krytyce koncepcji Fregego. Bh|dy te pojawiajy 
si| w ramach poruszanych przez Russela problemów: rozró{nienia sens-nominat, denotacji dla 
zwrotów denotujycych i nazw pustych, u{ycia zasady salva veritate i negatywnych twierdze} 
egzystencjalnych. 
W pierwszej kolejno~ci wskaujemy na dwa interpretacyjne bh|dy Russela zwiyzane z jego 
dwoma twierdzeniami odno~nie do teorii Fregego: tym, {e gdy pragniemy mówi o znaczeniu 
zwrotu denotujycego, naturalnym sposobem jest u{ycie cudzyshowów, oraz sugestii, {e jedyne co 
zaproponowah Frege, w przypadkach gdy (mo{e si| zdarzy i{) wyra{eniu brak denotacji, to 
konwencjonalne zawarowanie jej przez zdefiniowanie desygnatu (np. w postaci zbioru pustego). 
Nast|pnie wskazujemy na zaniedbanie Russella dotyczyce braku omówienia Fregego mo{liwych 
rozwiyza} w przypadku hamighówki pierwszej (Scott jest autorem Waverleya), drugiej (król 
Francji jest ^ysy) i trzeciej (ró_nica mi`dzy A i B nie istnieje). 
Strebcili Adam Pawe^ Kubiak i Piotr Lipski 
  
 
GETTING STRAIGHT ON HOW RUSSELL 
UNDERESTIMATED FREGE  
S u m m a r y  
Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed 
in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. 
The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in 
presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, 
and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not 
do justice to Frege: that we speak of a sense by means of quotation marks, and that all Frege does 
to cope with phrases that might denote nothing is define an arbitrary object as their reference. 
Second, we will show that Russell omitted the fact that Frege’s theory provided some answers for 
the puzzles presented by Russell in his essay. 
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S)owa kluczowe: j|zyk, semantyka, znaczenie, desygnat, deskrypcja, nazwa pusta, identyczno~, 
kompleks denotujycy. 
Key words: language, semantics, meaning, reference, description, empty name, identity, 
denoting complex. 
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